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A NONORIGINALISM FOR ORIGINALISTS
JAMAL GREENE*

Originalism is an ideology, not a practice. It is a brand, an affiliation, a set
of background principles, an often unstated set of restorative commitments. As
James Fleming says in his book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution,
originalism is an "ism."1' As an "ism," Fleming writes, originalism did not exist
before the 1970s: "Constitutional interpretation in light of original
understanding did exist, but original understanding was seen as merely one
source of constitutional decision-making among several-not as a general
theory of constitutional interpretation, much less the exclusive legitimate
2
theory."
This brief Comment on Fleming's book takes the practice Fleming
identifies---"constitutional interpretation in light of original understanding," or
what I will call CILOU-as its starting point. As masterfully as Fleming
upbraids originalism as an ism, he wishes to leave untouched, indeed celebrates
CILOU. 3 What accounts for this normative disjuncture? Is it defensible?
Fleming does not give us the resources to answer this question.
Fleming gives three reasons to be opposed to originalism. First, he finds it
authoritarian and insulting. 4 It insults the founders by suggesting that they
would have insisted on our following their expectations, and it insults all of us
in the here and now by "attributing to us, a self-governing people, a
subservience to such founders' authoritarian, arrogant will."'5 Second, Fleming
objects to the idea, which he ties to originalism, that constitutional
6
interpretation does not require the exercise of moral and political judgment.
He argues that such judgments are both inevitable and desirable. 7 Finally,
Fleming believes that originalism rejects the idea of fidelity "as honoring our
* Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I would like to thank James Fleming for a
stimulating book and for providing an opportunity for this commentary.
I JAMES E. FLEMING, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION: FOR MORAL READINGS
AND AGAINST ORIGINALISMS 3 (2015); see also Jonathan R. Macey, Originalism as an
"Ism", 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 301, 301-02 (1996).
2 Fleming, supra note 1, at 3-4.
3 See id.
at 10 ("[G]eneric consideration of original meaning takes an eclectic approach
and regards it as one among several available sources of constitutional interpretation...
[and] is not what we mean by originalism.").
4 See id at 20.

5 See id. at 19-20.
6 See id. at 20.

7 See id.
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aspirational principles.., rather than as following our historical practices,"
which are imperfect. 8 Fleming rejects the notion that the only way to honor the
Constitution is to understand it in narrow historical terms. 9
Part I outlines two distinct ways of understanding the prominence of CILOU
in U.S. constitutional interpretation. Its dominant manifestations are
interpretive pluralism and the use of original sources to resolve ambiguity over
relatively specific constitutional provisions. Part II shows that each of
Fleming's criticisms of originalism applies to CILOU. Rejecting the ideology
of originalism on the grounds Fleming urges seems to entail rejecting the
practice of CILOU, which both originalists and nonoriginalists seem to accept.
Part III suggests that Fleming's failure to account for the shortcomings of
CILOU follows from the fact that his proposed moral reading is, like
originalism, an ideology. It is an ism rather than a practice and so has more to
say about how judges affiliate than about how they behave in the wild. Indeed,
we can understand originalism itself as a moral reading whose attraction, like
Fleming's own theory, depends on its power to persuade.

I
During the 2016 presidential primary campaign season, a question arose
over Ted Cruz's eligibility for the office.' 0 The Constitution requires, among
other things, that the president be "a natural born Citizen,"' 1 a term the
document does not define. Cruz was born in Canada. At the time of Cruz's
birth, his mother was a U.S. citizen and his father a Canadian resident and
Cuban expatriate.' 2 Under a federal statute in effect at the time, birth abroad to
a U.S. citizen-parent conferred U.S. citizenship at birth assuming certain other

8

Id.

9 See id ("A moral reading, because it understands that the quest for fidelity in
interpreting our imperfect Constitution exhorts us to interpret it so as to make it the best it

can be, offers hope that the Constitution may deserve our fidelity, or at least may be able to
earn it.").
10 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Yes, Ted Cruz is a 'NaturalBorn Citizen', WASH. POST
(Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/01/07/

yes-ted-cruz-is-a-natural-born-citizen [https://perma.cc/4NWF-G4GE] ("The bottom line:
There is no question about Ted Cruz's constitutional eligibility to be elected president.");
Robert Clinton, U.S. NEWS, Ted Cruz isn't a 'NaturalBorn' Citizen, (Jan. 27, 2016, 7:00
AM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-01-27/ted-cruz-is-not-a-natural-borncitizen-according-to-the-constitution [https://perma.cc/A232-VUJ3] ("According to the
Constitution, because Sen. Ted Cruz was not born in the United States, he is not eligible to
run for president.").
11U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
12 See Manuel Roig-Franzia, Cruz Looks for a Fight, Finds Spotlight, WASH. POST, May

7, 2013, at Cl.
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conditions were satisfied. 13 It is an open question whether citizenship at birth
conveyed by statute makes one a "natural born Citizen" for the purposes of
14
presidential eligibility.
My interest is not in the answer to this question but rather in how it has
customarily been debated among constitutional scholars. Along with much of
the punditry around this issue, all sides have generally assumed that the
appropriate sources for ascertaining the meaning of the Natural Born Citizen
Clause are historical ones, and that the correct answer follows from analysis of
those materials and little else.15 In an online essay written before the primary
season, former Solicitor General Paul Clement and former Acting Solicitor
General Neal Katyal claimed that "the relevant materials clearly indicate that a
'natural bom Citizen' means a citizen from birth with no need to go through
naturalization proceedings.' 6 The "relevant materials" for them were British
common law and enactments of the First Congress, along with private
correspondence between John Jay and George Washington said to be
illustrative of original purposes. 17 On the other side, Mary Brigid McManamon
has argued based on her own reading of eighteenth-century British common
law and on statements by James Madison and other founding era figures that
Cruz "is not a natural-born citizen and therefore is not eligible to be president
8
or vice president of the United States.'
As this discourse suggests, and as Fleming recognizes, the use of original
understanding in constitutional interpretation is neither new nor rare. It shows
up in at least two ways. First, it is one element of a pluralistic or eclectic
approach to constitutional interpretation.' 9 Under such an approach,
13

Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended, § 301(a)(7), Pub. L. 82-414, 66

Stat. 163, 236 (requiring that the citizen parent have been physically present in the U.S. for a
total often years, at least five of which must have been after turning fourteen).
14 For extended discussion of this question, see Michael D. Ramsey, The Original
Meaning
of "Natural
Born", (Jan.
7, 2016)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=-2712485 [https://perma.cc/BW3K-N7DA].
15 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 10.
16 Paul Clement & Neal Katyal, On the Meaning of "NaturalBorn Citizen", 128 HARv.
L. REv. FORUM 161, 161 (2015).
17 See id. at 161-63.
18See Mary Brigid McManamon, Ted Cruz Is Not Eligible To Be President,WASH. POST
(Jan. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ted-cruz-is-not-eligible-to-bepresident/2016/01/12/1484a7d0-b7af-1 1 e5-99f3-184bc379b l2d story.html
[https://perma.cc/GR5D-QE8Z]; see also Mary Brigid McManamon, The Natural Born
Citizen Clause as Originally Understood,64 CATH. U. L. REv. 317, 330 (2015).
19 See PHILrP BOBB1TT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1982)

(arguing that there are five types of constitutional argument: historical, textual, structural,
prudential, and doctrinal); Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive
Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEo. L.J. 1765, 1787 (1997)
("Depending on the context, the Court will sometimes favor one form of argument, but at
other times favor others."); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of
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constitutional interpreters use multiple modes of inquiry, including those based
on constitutional text, history, and structure, on legal and political precedent, or
on practical consequences, without necessarily privileging any one in
particular. 20 Take, for example, City of Boerne v. Flores.21 There, the Court
invalidated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") as exceeding
Congress's power to enforce the constitutional prohibition on religious
discrimination under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 22 The City of Boerne
Court engaged with the meaning of the word "enforce" in § 5, with previous
precedents
applying
constitutional
enforcement
provisions, 23 with
24
congressional debates in the process of drafting the Fourteenth Amendment,
with structural arguments about the Constitution's supremacy over ordinary
legislative acts, 25 with consequentialist arguments about the costs RFRA would
impose on states,26 and with what Philip Bobbitt would call ethical arguments
about the constitutive nature of the separation of powers in the American
system of government. 27 Fleming seems to have pluralism of this sort in mind
when he refers to CILOU.

28

The second way in which CILOU has generally shown up in actual cases is
when the Court interprets relatively specific constitutional provisions. Take,
for example, the 2015 case of Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission.29 At issue was whether Arizona's use

Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1189, 1189-90 (1987) (explaining that

"most judges ... recognize the relevance of at least five kinds of constitutional meaning"
including the plain or original meaning of the text).
20 See Fallon, supra note 19, at 1189-90.
2' 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (hearing a challenge to a "decision by local zoning authorities to
deny a church a building permit" under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
22 Id. at 535 ("Broad as the power of Congress is under the Enforcement Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation
of powers and the federal balance.").
See id. at 516-19, 524-29.
24 See id. at 520-24.
25 See id. at 529.
26 See id. at 534-35 ("[Tlhe statute ...
23

would require searching judicial scrutiny of state
law with the attendant likelihood of invalidation. This is a considerable congressional
intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the
health and welfare of their citizens.").
27 See id. at 535-36 ("When the political branches of the Government act against the
background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be
understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the
respect due them under settled principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations
must be disappointed.").
28 See FLEMING, supra note 1, at 3-4 ("[O]riginal understanding was seen as merely one
source of constitutional decision-making among several.").
29 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015) (analyzing an amendment to the Arizona Constitution to
"remove redistricting authority form the Arizona Legislature").
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30
of an independent redistricting commission violated the Elections Clause.
The Elections Clause assigns to "the Legislature" of each state the power-in
the first instance-to prescribe the "Times, Places and Manner" of holding
congressional elections, 3 1 but the Arizona commission was established via
ballot initiative to remove from the Arizona Constitution the state legislature's
role in redistricting. 32 Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Ginsburg relied
largely on period dictionaries, 33 the Convention debates, 34 the state ratification
debates, 35 and Lockean views of popular sovereignty embodied within the
Declaration of Independence 36 to make the point, in essence, that the Framers
would have approved of commissions such as the one before the Court.
Fleming's book does not discuss the use of originalist methods to recover
the original expectations about relatively specific constitutional language as a
guide to solving modem problems. Like other critics of originalism, though,
Fleming implies that his own preferred reading leaves intact specific
constitutional language that is clear and not susceptible to a political
workaround. 37 A standard example here is the requirement that the President
be at least thirty-five years old. 38 However, the Natural Born Citizen Clause
and the Arizona case are less standard examples because these texts are
ambiguous with respect to the meaning of birthright citizenship and the word
"legislature." The text cannot answer the question clearly, and yet, as a matter
of positive practice, we observe judges and scholars across the political
spectrum reflexively turn to CILOU.3 9 This turn to CILOU reflects a practice,
not an ideology.

30 Id. at 2659 ("The Arizona legislature's complaint alleged that ... the [Elections]
Clause precludes resort to an independent commission, created by initiative to accomplished
redistricting.").
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
32 See Ariz. Indep. Redist. Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. at 2671 (discussing how the Arizona

Legislature could have delegated redistricting power to a commission if it so chose).
3 See id. at 2671.
3 See id. at 2672.

3 See id.
36 See id. at 2674-75.

37 See FLEMING, supra note 1, at 176-79.
38 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; see also Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original
Meaning, 24 CONST. CoMMENT. 291, 305 (2007) ("Underlying principles are necessary to
constitutional interpretation when we face a relatively abstract constitutional command
rather than language that offers a fairly concrete rule, like the requirement that there are two
houses of Congress or that the President must be 35 years of age."); Ronald Dworkin,
Fidelity as Integrity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1249,
1252 (1997) (using the Constitutional requirement that the President be at least thirty-five

years old as an example).
" See Jamal Greene, Rule Originalism, 117 COLUM. L. REv. (forthcoming 2017) (on file
with author).
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II
Fleming's criticisms of originalism appear to apply as well to both of the
aforementioned ways in which our practice has long resorted to CILOU.
Fleming's first argument against originalism is that it is authoritarian and
removes popular agency from the practice of constitutional interpretation.
Fleming is a proponent of democratic deliberation40 and worries that linking
interpretation to the practices and expectations of the founders constitutes a
41
form of undue subservience to the past.
Fleming is right about this, but his criticism seems to extend beyond what he
calls the "aspirational" aspects of the Constitution. Why should we ever
consider the framers' expectations in constitutional interpretation, as Fleming
concedes we sometimes do and indeed should? As Fleming writes, "[h]istory
is, can only be, and should only be a starting point in constitutional
interpretation. It has a threshold role, which is often not dispositive. ' '42 Fleming
believes that history can help to preclude "off-the-wall" interpretations of the
Constitution that do not "fit" within our constitutional tradition. 43 But we best
avoid undue subservience to history if history plays no role whatsoever in
constitutional interpretation. At the same time, it is question-begging to say
that history is not often dispositive. When history should or should not be
dispositive-and why or why not-are the meta-interpretive questions we are
trying to answer. Why should the framers get to decide what is an on- or offthe-wall interpretation two centuries after their deaths?
Second, Fleming argues that originalists err in believing that moral and
political theory should be banished from constitutional interpretation, given
that the Constitution "establishes a scheme of abstract aspirational principles
and ends, not a code of detailed rules." 44 Plainly, the Constitution establishes
both abstract principles-"[n]o state shall.., deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws" 45-and a code of detailed rules"[t]he President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen

40 See generally JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE

OF AUTONOMY (2006).
41 See FLEMING, supra note 1, at 19-20 ("Originalism insults the founders by attributing
to them authoritarianism and arrogance-that they presumed to decide our constitutional
questions for us and to insist on our following their definitions or original expected
applications of our constitutional commitments, rather than to establish a framework or
great outline for a self-governing people to be built out over time in light of our experience
and our moral and political leaning. Originalism insults us by attributing to us, a selfgoverning people, a subservience to such founders' authoritarian, arrogant will.").
42 Id. at 95. Fleming also says that "we must reject any idea of an obligation to follow
original expected applications or precedents as such." Id. at 103. If that is true, it would

suggest that history is never dispositive.
43 Id.

44id. at 20.
45 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire
at the End of their next Session. '46 But both the principles and the rules often
require interpretation. Even the meaning of the detailed rule just stated was
47
bitterly contested in NLRB v. Noel Canning.
It is not clear to me whether Fleming believes moral and political theory
are-and should-be relevant because the Constitution includes abstract
principles or instead because the meaning and scope of its provisions are
subject to reasonable disagreement that may be resolved only through moral
reasoning. The former reason, which Fleming's book suggests repeatedly, does
not tell us what the role of moral theory is-or should be-in a case like Noel
Canning. The latter reason would suggest that the presence, or not, of abstract
principles is irrelevant because the application of all such principles is subject
to reasonable disagreement, and the presence of disagreement vel non is all we
need to ascertain. But the view that ambiguity is a sufficient ground to ignore
founding expectations, even as to detailed rules, subscribes to a curious
definition of constitutional fidelity, one that Fleming's book does not defend
and that our constitutional practice betrays. 48 Justice Breyer did not feel
liberated to ignore the original understanding of the ambiguous phrase "the
recess of the Senate" in Noel Canning, and indeed the merits of the case
49
seemed not to engage his or anyone else's moral instincts at all.
To wit, Fleming's third overarching criticism of originalism is its
impoverished understanding of constitutional fidelity. Fleming is perhaps the
greatest living proponent of the view that referring to moral values or political
theory when filling in the content of the Constitution's more abstract
provisions qualifies as a form of constitutional fidelity. 50 But what about the
Constitution's specific provisions, which overwhelm the abstract ones in
quantity if not in prominence? Would reference to moral theory-rather than to
our best judgment as to original understanding-in resolving Noel Canning or
in resolving Cruz's constitutional fitness to be president be faithful to the
Constitution? Certainly it seems immoral and undemocratic to deny the
presidency to a U.S. citizen based on Blackstone's views ofjus soli principles,
and yet that is where the debate around Cruz's eligibility has been centered.
The text in Cruz's case is ambiguous. Does that ambiguity alone convert the
inquiry into a moral one? What about the presidential age requirement? Or the
requirement that each state have two Senators? Is moral theory ever defeasible
by original understanding? If so, when? If not, why not?

Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
47 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2556 (2014).
48 See generally Greene, supra note 39.
4 See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2561-62, 2567-68.
50 See Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of HistoricalFact in Original
Meaning, 91 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 65 n.155 (2015) ("The phrase 'moral reading' is
Dworkin's... but it is now strongly associated with James Fleming's Dworkinian theory of
46

constitutional interpretation and construction.").
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Fleming's moral reading, like originalism, is an ideology, not a practice. An
ideology reasons deductively from the top on down rather than inductively
from the bottom on up. As an ideology, originalism means understanding the
Constitution as a text rather than as a set of practices. Thus, originalists draw
distinctions between interpretation and construction, 5' between sense and
reference 52 and between original meaning and original intent. 53 Interpretation
is ascertaining the linguistic meaning of a text; construction is giving "legal
effect" to that meaning. The sense of a word is "what is strictly conveyed and
expressed by the language alone; ' 54 the reference is "the tangible actual thing
in the world that the word picks out," 55 which depends on facts about the
world. Determinations of original meaning are about ascertaining the
communicative content of a word; references to intent, which litter the U.S.
56
Reports, are merely evidentiary or rhetorical.
51

See, e.g.,

OF LIBERTY

RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION

118-22 (2003);

KErrH E. WHITrINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 5-7

(1999); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-ConstructionDistinction, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 95, 100 (2010).
52 See Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 ST.
Louis L.J. 555, 558 (2006).
53 See BARNETT, supra note 51, at 92-93; Antonin Scalia, Address Before the Attorney
General's Conference on Economic Liberties in Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986), in
OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A
SOURCEBOOK 106 (1987) ("I suppose I ought to campaign to change the label from the
Doctrine of Original Intent to the Doctrine of Original Meaning. . . . [T]erminology is
destiny.").
14 Green, supra note 52, at 563.
55 Id. As Green explains, he is applying taxonomies well known to philosophers of
language to constitutional law. See id. at 559 ("[D]istinctions of long standing in the
philosophy of language can present a compelling distinction between which of the
Constitution's attributes change and which do not"); see also, e.g., Gottlob Frege, Sense and
Reference, 57 PHIL. REV. 209 (1948).
56 See Jamal Greene, The Case for OriginalIntent, 80 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1685
(2012) ("[O]riginal intent not only matters but it matters more than original meaning.");
Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113 (2003) ("If the project of constitutional
interpretation is to determine the original meaning of the Constitution . . . and not to
determine either the Framers' or Ratifiers' subjective intention, it is not at all clear that it is
'cheating,' or even ill-advised, to use the secret drafting history of the Constitution as
another extratextual source of constitutional meaning."). Some originalists continue to focus
on original intent based on a theory of the identity between intent and meaning, not because
they believe in giving substantive weight to intentions as expected application. See, e.g.,
KEITH E. WHITTiNGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL

INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REvIEw 163 (1999) ("The goal of originalism is not to imagine the

subjective intent of members of the ratifying convention but to seek evidence of the
objective intent that informs the meaning of the text."); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna
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In practice, even those judges who are associated with originalism as an
ideology do not typically draw self-conscious distinctions between
interpretation and construction, sense and reference, or meaning and intent.
They temper their originalist commitments with stare decisisj 7 they ignore
original understandings when inconvenient, 8 and they make concessions to
common sense and their place on a multimember Court.5 9
As an ideology, the moral reading views the Constitution as a set of
aspirational principles. Those principles need not be inconsistent with the text,
but the text is often beside the point.60 The ideology of the moral reading
cautions against relying on the dead hand of the past 61 and the competence of
lawyers to do serious legal history. 62 The ideology of the moral reading
supports progressive results in court decisions without worrying about the need
to articulate serious limitations on judicial power. 63 Critics of Ronald Dworkin
64
argued that he too often ignored the dimension of what he called "fit."

Prakash, "Is That English You're Speaking?'" Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an
Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 967, 969 (1996) (arguing that "that one cannot interpret
texts without reference to the intentions of some author"); Richard S. Kay, Original
Intention and Public Meaning in ConstitutionalInterpretation,103 Nw. U. L. REv. 703,
704 (2009) (arguing that "in the actual course of adjudication by honest and competent
judges, original intention and original public meaning interpretation should usually yield the
same result").
57 See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 864 (1989)
("I hasten to confess that in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist. I cannot
imagine myself, any more than any other federal judge, upholding a statute that imposes the
punishment of flogging. But then I cannot imagine such a case's arising either."); see also
United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 348
(2007) (Scalia, J., concurring) (acknowledging a willingness to rely on stare decisis); United
States v. Lopez, 549 U.S. 514, 601 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("This extended
discussion of the original understanding and our first century and a half of case law does not
necessarily require a wholesale abandonment of our more recent opinions.").
58 See generally Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism,71 MD. L. REv. 978
(2012).
59 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 (2008).
60 See David A. Strauss, Foreword Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129
HARv. L. REv. 2, 4 (2015) ("Clear text does not always govern, as the anomalies show;
there are times when established principles are simply inconsistent with the text. Beyond
that, constitutional "interpretation" usually has little to do, in practice, with the words of the
text.").
61 See FLEMING, supra note 1, at 19-20.
62 See Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 523, 549-55 (1995).
63 See FLEMING, supra note 1, at 89; Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56

N.Y.U. L. REV. 353,353 (1981).
64 See RONALD DWORKIN: FREEDOM's LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN

CONSTTrUrON 36 (1996); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson, Antigone and
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Fleming is sensitive to this dimension and criticism, but he also is circumspect
in saying when, precisely, the Court has gone--or would go-too far in
applying moral or political theory to achieve constitutional justice. 65 The
absence of real limits is immanent within the ideology of the moral reading.
In practice, even those judges associated with the moral reading as an
ideology are sometimes "originalist" and often cautious. As mentioned, Justice
66
Ginsburg wrote an originalist opinion in the Arizona redistricting case.
Justice Stevens wrote an originalist dissenting opinion in District of Columbia
v. Heller,67 which concerned the scope of the right to bear arms under the
Second Amendment. 68 Fleming cites both Justice Ginsburg and Justice Stevens
as examples of "moral readers. ' 69 Earl Warren wrote an originalist opinion in
Powell v. McCormack,70 on the ability of the House of Representatives to
exclude a member because of allegations of corruption. 71 Chief Justice Warren
of course authored the Court's unanimous opinion in Brown v. Board of
Education,72 which Fleming uses as a core illustration of his philosophic
73
approach.

There are several possible lessons we can draw from the observation that the
ideologies of originalism and the moral reading do not appear to match their
practice. The most convenient explanation is that judges are politically
74
expedient institutional players and face constraints that weaken their resolve.

Creon, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 248, 248 (William N.
Eskridge & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998).
65See FLEMING, supra note 1, at 89.
66 See Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redist. Comm'n, 135 S.Ct. 2652, 2671 (2015)
(deferring to the "history and purpose" of the Elections Clause and to definitions of
"legislature" in dictionaries in circulation at the time of ratification to find that the people of
Arizona were constitutionally permitted to create "a commission operating independently of
the state legislature to establish congressional districts").
67 554 U.S. 570 (2008).

68 See id.at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Specifically, there is no indication that the
Framers of the Amendment intended to enshrine the common-law right of self-defense in
the Constitution.").
69 See FLEMING, supra note 1, at 44.
70 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
71See id.at 502 (relying on the history and original purpose of the Speech or Debate
Clause to provide protection under the clause not just to debate, but also to "[c]ommittee
reports, resolutions, and the act of voting").
72 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
73See FLEMING, supra note 1, at 44, 75-76.
74 Cf.ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT

THE BAR OF POLITICS 65-72 (1962) (describing the relationship between President Lincoln
and the Supreme Court in the wake of the DredScott opinion and criticizing the court for
legitimizing certain practices when it could have otherwise left the issue undecided).
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On this telling, the Court contains originalists and moral readers in exile, 75 and
it is appropriate to criticize or at least to draw attention to the discontinuity
between their practices and the ideologies we ascribe to them. That
76
discontinuity renders them impure.
I suspect, though, that the vast majority of judges, including those on the
Supreme Court, do not understand themselves or their practices in these
polemical terms. Rather, they are socialized into a culture of bounded
eclecticism. It is eclectic in that it includes multiple modes of inquiry and does
not systematically prioritize any one over any of the others. Indeed, we might
say, with Richard Fallon, that a judge's modes of interpretation are mutually

constitutive. 77 Judges do not interpret text, structure, history, precedent, or
consequences sequentially or hermetically; instead, they interpret text in light
78
ofhistory, precedent, structure, consequences, and so forth.
That eclecticism is bounded in at least two ways, one internal and the other
external. First, the use of particular modes of interpretation is not random but
may depend on the susceptibility of certain questions to harmonious
multimodal construction. According to Fallon, text and history take precedence
in such circumstances. 79 Strauss would suggest that precedent has priority over
both text and history. 80 Regardless of who is correct, they agree that U.S.
constitutional judges are internally motivated to prioritize particular
75 Cf Stephen E. Sachs, The "Constitution in Exile" as a Problemfor Legal Theory, 89
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 2253, 2255 (2014) (defining a "constitution in exile" as "the 'real' or
'true' law, obscured by usurping courts and officials" or as "a plan for law reform, an
attempt to revise the law under the cover of restoring it").
76 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique of "Faint-Hearted"
Originalism,75 U. CrN. L. REv. 7 (2006).
7 See Fallon, supra note 19, at 1193 ("The various kinds of constitutional argument are
substantially interrelated dnd interdependent. Reciprocal influences among them make it
possible most of the time to achieve constructivist coherence.").
78 See id. (asserting that the "norms of our constitutional practice call for a constitutional
interpreter to assess and reassess the arguments in the various categories in an effort to
understand each of the relevant factors as prescribing the same result"); Curtis A. Bradley &
Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text, 64 DUKE L.J. 1213,
1286-87 (2015) (explaining that perception of consequences, history, and the specificity of
the text can influence constitutional construction).
71 See Fallon, supra note 19, at 1193-94 (arguing that "the implicit norms of our
constitutional practice accord the foremost authority to arguments from text, followed, in
descending order, by arguments concerning the framers' intent, constitutional theory,
precedent, and moral and policy values").
80 See DAviD A. STRAuss, THE LIVTNG CONsTITuTION 35 (2010) (arguing that precedents
are "indispensable" in understanding "the constitution as it actually operates, in practice"
and attributing the protection of freedom of speech and the decision in Brown v. Board of
Education not to "careful reading of the text" or "adherence to original understandings," but
to "the evolution of precedents"); Strauss, supra note 60, at 17 (["T]here are important
domains of constitutional law in which the common law-the precedents and the policiescomes first, and the text follows.").
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interpretive modes under conditions of uncertainty. It might also be the case, as
I have argued elsewhere, that there are default modes of interpretation, the
choice of which depends on the kind of question judges confront. 81 It appears,
for example, that judges are relatively more likely to excavate specific
historical understandings to answer relatively specific constitutional questions
such as the meaning of "legislature" in the Arizona case or the meaning of
"natural born Citizen" in Cruz's. 82 They are relatively less likely to use specific
understandings to answer questions pertaining to relatively open-ended
83
provisions such as those found in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Second, as with all else constitutional judges do in the course of
adjudication, a court's opinion-writing practices are constrained by judges'
need to persuade. This source of constraint is external rather than internal.
Constitutional law imposes rhetorical demands upon judges that condition and
even compete with any independent sense they might have as to what the law
requires of them.84 The most important audience for judicial persuasion on a
multimember court is likely to be the opinion-writer's colleagues, whom he or
she wants to join the opinion or at least not to object too strenuously. 85
Opinions that do not appear to fit the modes of reasoning into which judges are
socialized will be less likely to succeed at attracting joins or discouraging
86
strong dissents.
In addition, federal judges may also seek to persuade elements of the public.
This includes the lawyer professional class from which they are typically
drawn and may also, at times, include the broader public. 87 Support from the
public, perhaps refracted through the prism of intermediaries in the
professional class, is necessary to validate constitutional law. And so even if a
judge has persuaded herself that the moral reading is the one true path to
81 See Greene, supra note 39.
82 See id.

13 See id.; see generally STRAUSS, supra note 80, at 85-92.
8 See Jamal Greene, Pathetic Argument in Constitutional Law, 113 COLUM. L. REv.
1389, 1452-58 (2013).

85See RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 31-33 (2008) (suggesting that the panel
composition influences decision outcomes because of "differences among panel members in
intensity of preference for a particular outcome, coupled with the phenomenon of 'dissent
aversion'); Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The
Same Way Everybody Else Does-Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud
Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 107 (2002) ("The most important audience is likely to be that
of other judges.").
86See Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 85, at 107-09 (describing the incentives for
judges to produce opinions that are "good enough" to avoid negative attention from other
judges).
87 See id at 106-07 (listing "the public, lawyers, other judges, academics, and the
legislature" as potential audiences for judicial opinions); Robert A. Leflar, Some
Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 810, 813-14 (1961)
(relating judges' response that they write their opinions, in part, for the public).
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constitutional interpretation, she cannot usually behave as if that is true, any
more than she can behave as if the Bible or the Republican Party platform
guides his or her decisions.
Focusing in this way on the practices of judges, which I have described as a
bounded eclecticism, offers a possibility that is disquieting to Fleming's
project: Originalism itself might be best understood as a moral reading. Like
Fleming, originalists are also "thinking for themselves about what
constitutional provisions seem to refer to" 88 and "making philosophic choices
in elaborating the meanings of our constitutional commitments." 89 As it turns
out, their moral readings lead them to conservative or libertarian outcomes,
whether in favor of gun rights or school prayer or against campaign finance
restrictions or the regulatory state more generally, but the moral reading does
not exclude these outcomes as a conceptual matter.
Of course, with limited exceptions,9" originalists do not explicitly endorse
the moral reading or anything like it. They claim that judges should be faithful
to the original understandings of the framers. But of course they claim that;
they are attempting to stay within the bounds of acceptable constitutional
argument, all the while nudging it towards their own preferred substantive
positions. Like moral readers, originalists are incorporating moral judgments
into the Constitution, trying to make it best by their own considered lights,
even as they rhetorically mediate those judgments through a language of
original meaning and constitutional fidelity. The moral reading can serve the
ends of originalists as much as nonoriginalists. 91
In the end, I agree with much of Fleming's perceptive book, but I find
myself asking what is at stake in the label of "originalist" or "moral reader."
Fleming disputes Jack Balkin's claim to being an originalist and argues that
Bruce Ackerman is far less distant from Dworkin than he claims to be. 92 Both,
Fleming says, are in fact engaged in the same big-tent project of moral
reading. 93 In seeking converts to the ideology of moral reading, just what is it
that Fleming is seeking to maximize? Progressive outcomes? Not likely, for he
concedes that the project is the same, and indeed that there may be rhetorical

88 FLEMING, supra note 1, at 22.
'9

Id. at 22-23.

277 (2011) ("[F]idelity to original meaning
and the idea of a living Constitution that adapts to changing times and conditions are not
rival theories of constitutional interpretation; they are actually compatible positions.").
90 See JACK M. BALKN, LIVING ORIGINALISM

91 See Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in
Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 218 (2008); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a
PoliticalPractice: The Right's Living Constitution, 75 FoRDHAM L. REV. 545, 546 (2006).
92 See FLEMING, supra note 1, at 156-61.

93 See id. at 96, 160-61 ("[W]e should conceive the moral reading as a big tent that can
encompass broad originalist, living originalist, or living constitutionalist conceptions such as
those developed by Ackerman and Balkin.").
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94
benefits to Ackerman and Balkin presenting their theories as they do.
Candor? Perhaps, but the value of candor in constitutional adjudication must
be defended. 95 Likes? Maybe, but as noted, recognizing that moral judgments
are inseparable from constitutional law might make it all the more urgent that
constitutional interpreters adopt rhetoric that masks that fact. Fleming might
well have articulated a nonoriginalism for originalists.

CONCLUSION

Judges have a job to do. That job sometimes involves making moral
judgments and it sometimes involves using history to reach sound resolutions
of constitutional controversies. Were they to abandon either moral judgments,
pace originalists, or the use of history, pace moral readers, they would cease to
be judges within the American system. 96 And so the current battle between
originalists and moral readers occurs in an ideational space outside of
adjudicative law, perhaps outside of law altogether. That is not to say that law
is not ideological or worthy of study. It is, rather, to say the opposite. We
might profit from turning our microscope from the discourses that surround the
law and back to the law itself.

14See id. at 158 ("[E]ven some living constitutionalist critics of originalism are in the
grip of the 'originalist premise'-the premise or assumption that the best understanding of
fidelity... is necessarily originalist.").
95See Jamal Greene, The Meming of Substantive Due Process, 30 CONST. COMMENT.
at
31),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
(forthcoming
2016)
(manuscript
papers.cfm?abstract id=2717255 [https://perma.cc/PL5B-Y7MZ].
96 See generally BOBBITT, supra note 19.

